Law and individuality by Strauss, D.F.M.
 Koers 72(1) 2007:1-25  1 
Law and individuality 
D.F.M. Strauss 
Dean’s Office 
Faculty of the Humanities 
University of the Free State  
BLOEMFONTEIN 
E-mail: dfms@cknet.co.za
Abstract 
Law and individuality 
The main contours of the history of philosophical and scientific 
conceptions of law and individuality are portrayed. This includes 
an account of perspectives and views found in ancient Greece, 
the Graeco-Roman world, the medieval speculation and, via the 
Renaissance, in early modern developments that were contin-
ued in the Enlightenment era, in Romanticism and historicism, 
and were eventually manifested in the linguistic turn. What is 
important for a proper understanding of modern law concep-
tions is an acknowledgement of the all-pervading influence of 
modern nominalism. This orientation was characterised by 
employing two related distinctions, namely the distinction be-
tween conceptual knowledge and concept-transcending know-
ledge, and that between rationalism and irrationalism. From a 
systematic point of view, various aspectual terms provide a 
frame of reference for the idea of a law of nature as a com-
pound basic concept of science. Special attention is given to 
the nature of normative principles and physical laws. In the last 
part of the article, these perspectives are applied to a brief as-
sessment of differences and similarities in the thought of 
Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven. 
Wet en individualiteit 
Opsomming 
Hierdie artikel lê die hoofkontoere uit die geskiedenis van die 
besinning oor die aard van wet en individualiteit bloot. Dit 
omspan perspektiewe en sienings uit antieke Griekeland, die 
Grieks-Romeinse wêreld, die midddeleeuse spekulasie en die 
Renaissance. Vroeg-moderne ontwikkelinge word opgevolg tot 
by die Verligting, die Romantiek, die historisme en die uit-
Law and individuality   
eindelike wending na die taal. Van besondere betekenis vir die 
verstaan van moderne opvattings oor die aard van ’n wet is die 
alles-deurdringende invloed van die moderne nominalisme – ’n 
oriëntering wat deur twee parallellopende onderskeidings ge-
definieer is, naamlik die onderskeiding tussen begripskennis en 
begripstransderende kennis en dié tussen rasionalisme en ir-
rasionalisme. Vanuit ’n sistematiese perspektief is verskillende 
modale terme gebruik om rekenskap te gee van die idee van ’n 
wet as ’n saamgestelde grondbegrip van ’n wetenskaplike dissi-
pline – met besondere verwysing na fisiese wette. In die laaste 
afdeling van die artikel word ’n samevattende beoordeling van 
verskille en ooreenkomste in die denke van Dooyeweerd en 
Vollenhoven gegee. 
1. Orientation 
The terms in the title are practically as old as Western philosophy 
itself. For this reason, we first have to pay attention to the historical 
background of the notion of law, after which an account will be given 
of the history of the idea of individuality, followed by a systematic 
appraisal of the connection between law and individuality. 
2. Contours regarding the history of the concept of law 
The original idea of law (nomos) had a broad scope. Hesiod 
accepted the idea of nomos by Zeus and it has to direct itself as an 
art of life towards the human being in general (Hesiod, 1962:276 ff.; 
see Plumpe, 1974:494). This initial understanding of law (logos) is 
not restricted to any domain of reality – it encompasses the world as 
a whole. Even when Anaximander says that there is a law of justice, 
that by virtue of the order of time brings everything that took on a 
limited form back to its formless origin (Diels & Kranz, 1959/1960: B. 
Fr.1), the idea of justice and injustice (dike and adikias) still do not 
merely apply to jural relationships, but to the cosmos as a whole. 
Heraclitus advanced the idea of a divine law (QeÃo" novmo") as 
principle of the universe, the world logos (lovgo") (Diels & Kranz, 
1959/1960 Heraclitus B. Fr. 30 ff.). Democritus added the idea that 
the commands of nature are necessary (Plumpe, 1974:494). 
In early Greek philosophy, the individuality of the human being was 
eventually also related to the world order – knowing the self opened 
the way to an understanding of the logos of the world. Heraclitus 
believed that discovering “my real self ” will enable an understanding 
of “the logos which is the real constitution of everything else as well” 
(Guthrie, 1962:419). 
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Although Greek political philosophy in Plato and Aristotle eventually 
restricted the notion of law to the political sphere (the Greek polis or 
city state), Cicero, in reaction to the idea that law is fluid and 
changeful, advances the view that all positive law must be under-
stood in terms of fixed legal principles, flowing from an ethical world 
order. The preferred designation of this order is found in the notion 
of a natural law, a lex naturalis.1 This idea of natural law was given 
in varying accounts, such as lex naturae, lex naturalis, ius naturae, 
and ius naturale, as well as those in expressions such as vera lex 
(true law), summa lex (supreme law), lex divina et humana (divine 
and human law), and so on (see Van Zyl, 1989:297-298). Cicero 
conceived a universal law that was assumed to be immutable, 
incorruptible, non-arbitrary, and valid per se. Jones points out that, 
flowing from divine reason, Cicero regards the ius naturale to 
comprise  
those half-legal, half-ethical rules that express the principles of 
human justice, because they have a bearing upon the relations 
of men living in society and upon their duties to one another 
and to the gods (Jones, 1956:99). 
Derived from the space metaphysics of the school of Parmenides, 
medieval philosophy contemplated an order of being that finds in 
God, as the ipsum esse, its culmination point. The realist legacy 
regarded Plato’s theory of ideas2 as its first starting point. During the 
early Middle Ages (via neo-Platonism), these eternal (super-sen-
sory) forms were transformed into creation ideas inherent to the 
divine mind (realistic metaphysics called them ante rem). Aristotle, 
with his secondary substance, focused on the orderliness (lawful-
ness) of reality, i.e. the universal way in which creatures show that 
they conform to an order for their existence.3 The view of universalia 
                                      
1 Compare, in this connection, his work “De republica” (Book 3, chapter 22; 
Cicero, 1978) as well as his “De Officiis” (Cicero, 1991). 
2 Plato actually discovered God’s steadfast law as order for creatures but 
metaphysically elevated it to his intelligible realm. 
3 Aristotle started with a purely individual primary substance, but in order to save 
conceptual knowledge, he introduced the universal substantial form of things (cf. 
Aristotle, 2001:7 ff.; Cat. 1 ff.). His example is that when this house passes 
away, it is not house-ness that passed away (Aristotle, 2001:807: “the being of 
house is not generated, but only the being of this house”; Metaph.1039 b 24-
25). We shall argue below that in being this or that, concretely existing entities 
(in a universal way) show that they are subject to a universal order for their 
existence. 
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in re in medieval realism continues this Aristotelian legacy. Next to 
universalia ante rem (platonic ideas) and universalia in re, medieval 
realism also accepts universal concepts within the human mind 
(universalia post rem). 
During the transition from the Medieval era to the Renaissance, 
nominalism emerged as a movement radically opposing the realistic 
metaphysics of the medieval period. William of Occam (1290-1350) 
assigned primacy to the will in reaction to the preference of Thomas 
Acquinas for the primacy of the intellect. However, the difference be-
tween Thomas Aquinas and Occam is their respective views on 
universality and individuality. Occam’s nominalism does not allow for 
anything universal outside the human mind (Occam, Summa logicae 
I, 14). Yet, according to him, science is concerned with universals 
within the human mind. This nominalistic orientation is explored by 
the main representatives of modern philosophy. Descartes (1965: 
part 1.58), for example, considers number and all universals as 
mere modes of thought.  
The fact that laws were indeed traditionally viewed as universal (in 
an ontic sense) now caused a problem. If there is no universality 
outside the human mind, an alternative understanding of the status 
of laws is required. How is it possible to subsume a multiplicity of 
individual things in reality to the universality of a law if there is 
nothing universal in an ontic sense? 
Much later, the first element of this problem caused the demise of 
the positivist philosophy of science. Leave aside for a moment the 
status of a law (“ontic” or “mental”); its supposed universality seems 
to be at odds with the limited number of instances that can actually 
be checked through (experimental) human investigation. It is known 
that Kant, early in his intellectual development, was strongly in-
fluenced by Leibniz. Therefore, the claim by Bennett, namely that we 
should “not credit Leibniz with any Kantian insight about the need for 
intellectual structure” is a little far-fetched (Bennett, 1974:37). Almost 
anticipating Kant’s criticism of Hume’s empiricism, Leibniz, more 
than thirty years before the first appearance of Hume’s A treatise of 
human nature (1739 – his An inquiry concerning human under-
standing appeared in 1748), wrote in his New essays: 
Now all the examples which confirm a general truth, whatever 
their number, do not suffice to establish the universal necessity 
of that same truth, for it does not follow that what has happened 
will always happen in the same way (quoted from Stich, 
1975:45, cf. Kant, 1956 [1787]:B:5). 
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According to Kant, the matter of experience lacks order; it is chaotic. 
It is only ordered through the sensory forms of intuition (space and 
time) and brought to unity by applying the categories of understand-
ing: “The categories are conditions of the possibility of experience, 
and are therefore valid a priori for all objects of experience” (Kant, 
1956 [1787]: B; 161). This entails that “[C]ategories are concepts 
which prescribe laws a priori to appearances, and therefore to na-
ture, the sum of all appearances” (Kant, 1956 [1787]: B; 163). 
In this way, Kant “solved” the above-mentioned problem: if there is 
no universality outside the human mind (as nominalism claims), then 
this vacancy has to be taken over by human understanding, with its 
universal concepts. Kant does not hesitate to state this extreme 
(subjectivist) conviction: “Understanding creates its laws (a priori) 
not out of nature, but prescribes them to nature” (Kant, 1969 
[1783]:2, 320; par. 36).4 Human understanding was thus promoted 
to become the (a priori and universally valid) formal law-giver of 
nature.5
Yet this position soon had to suffer from the relativity introduced by 
historicism, with its new appreciation of unique and individual histo-
rical events – this was emphasised during the early 19th century. 
By and large, the 18th century may be characterised as the age of 
Enlightenment in terms of its emphasis on the universality of con-
ceptual knowledge (identified with what was assumed to be ratio-
nal). The scope of the law of causality, for example, was supposed 
to be universal, and the same applies to Kant’s categorical impe-
rative – pursue only a maxim through which one at once will, that it 
thus may become a universal law (see Kant, 1786:52). 
                                      
4 More than a hundred years before the linguistic turn emerged at the beginning 
of the 20th century, Herder criticised Kant’s Critique of pure reason for neg-
lecting language. Herder made the switch from thought to language, evident in 
his statement that the human being is a creation of language (“Der Mensch ist 
ein freidenkendes, thätiges Wesen, dessen Kräfte in Progression fortwürken; 
darum sei er ein Geschöpf der Sprache!” – Herder, 1978:73) 
5 Wittgenstein continues this Kantian view when he says that everything outside 
logic is accidental (i.e. not subject to law), and that the exploration of logic 
means the exploration of everything that is subject to law (Wittgenstein, 1966: 
6.3: “Die Erforschung der Logik bedeutet die Erforschung aller Gesetzmäßigkeit. 
Und außerhalb die Logik ist alles Zufall”.) Even an element of Kant’s accent on 
understanding as the a priori formal law-giver of nature is continued, for 
Wittgenstein says that the law of causality is not a law, but the form of a law 
(Wiltgenstein, 1966:6.32), and likewise that the law of conservation is the a 
priori possibility of a logical form (Wiltgenstein, 1966:6.33). 
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An increasing sensitivity to the reality of individuality and what is 
unique in romanticism at the turn of the 18th to the 19th century, 
contributed to the rise of historicism – a philosophical trend attempt-
ing to turn away from the universalities of human reason by taking 
seriously what was considered the inherently changeful and ir-
repeatable: historical reality in its uniqueness and individuality. Ini-
tially it did seem as if this transitional process would succeed in 
maintaining a sound balance between universality and individuality. 
According to Meinecke, modern historicism even pursued the task of 
understanding both the individual structures of historical humanity 
and the general timeless laws-for-life in their universal coherences. 
When Meinecke characterises the highest worldview achievement of 
Goethe in terms of a balance between heraclitean and eleatic 
thought (eternal becoming and eternal being),6 it still seems as if 
Goethe attempted to do justice to both universality and what is 
individual. His need for eternal laws manifests the influence of neo-
Platonism and it reveals an element of continuity with Enlighten-
ment. Yet, in the final analysis, his appreciation of the universal ex-
perienced a twist in the direction of what is changeful and individual. 
Meinecke (1965:504) writes: 
Goethe’s concept of law was totally different from that of the 
Enlightenment, completely free from mathematical ingredients. 
Then Meinecke (1965:504) quotes Gundlof: 
Goethe’s laws themselves are individuals, delicately, elastic 
precisely though constantly mobile, mystical inner form forces.7  
Niebuhr, Leopold von Ranke’s tutor, demonstrates the transition 
from the 18th to the 19th century in a remarkable way. In opposition 
to Plato, who acknowledges only knowledge directed at the true 
(static) being of things as worthwhile, Niebuhr is convinced that only 
historical change provides a basis for sound knowledge (see 
Cassirer, 1957:237). In opposition to the deification of universal 
(conceptual) knowledge during the 18th century, we are brought into 
                                      
6 “So besteht Goethes höchste Weltanschauliche Leistung darin, daß er herak-
litisches und eleatisches Denken, ewiges Werden und ewiges Sein veschmolz – 
‘Dauer im Wechsel’.” (Meinecke, 1965:503.) 
7 “Goethes Gesetze sind selbst Individuen, dehnbar feine, dem immer bewe-
glichen eben geheimnisvoll innewohnende Formkräfte.” (Meinecke, 1965:504.) 
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contact with the importance of historical change – indeed with the 
rise of modern historicism. 
The supposedly universally valid construction of reality by the hu-
man subject eventually became a victim of the relativistic conse-
quences of this historicism. Combined with the so-called linguistic 
turn (by the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th 
century), the outcome of this process settled for a personally or 
socially constructed world – each person or each society constructs 
its own unique life-world. If the emphasis falls upon language, the 
additional qualification is that every person or society gives its own 
meaning to the world. 
Before we proceed to a systematic perspective, a number of crucial 
issues in the history of reflection on the nature of individuality ought 
to be highlighted as well. 
3. The problem of individuality 
Since Greek philosophy, a key problem was to find what became 
known as the principle of individualisation. Aristotle, for example, 
claimed that matter is the principle of individuality: “But all things 
many in number have matter.” (Aristotle, 2001:884; Metaf. 1074 a 
34.) We noted above that, from the opening sections of Aristotle’s 
work on categories, it is clear that he based his starting-point on the 
idea of a strictly individual primary substance. Here he defines 
substance “in the truest and most definite sense of the word” as 
“that which is neither predicable of a subject nor present in a sub-
ject” (Aristotle, 2001:9; Cat. 2 a 11-13). The secondary substances, 
however, are universal (Aristotle, 2001:9; Cat. 2-4) – species and 
genera are universal. 
Later on, in neo-Platonism, we find that priority is assigned to what 
is universal while acknowledging that what is individual cannot be 
conceived (see Plotinus, 1956: Enn. VI. 3.9.36 and Enn. VI. 2.22). 
Interestingly Simplicius already distinguished between the numerical 
one and what is individual (Kobusch, 1976:302).8 Ammonios Her-
meiu influenced the distinction between the four “complexions” 
found in the thought of Boethius: substantia universalis; substantia 
                                      
8 Implicitly this highlights the difference between what we will designate below, 
from a systematic perspective, as a conceptual use of numerical terms (the 
“numerical one”) and a concept-transcending use of numerical terms (the idea 
of an individual thing). 
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particularis; accidens universale; accidens particulare. Where singu-
larity indicates similarity for Richard von St. Victor, individual sub-
stantiality is found only in one individual, and therefore cannot be 
shared by multiple substances, and for this reason it is “incom-
municable” (see Kobusch, 1976:303). 
The commonly held view during the Middle Ages (shared by Bona-
ventura, Thomas Aquinas, Henry of Gent and Duns Scotus) was 
that an individual is undivided (the literal meaning of individuum), 
while at the same time being separated from everything else (see 
Oeing-Hanoff, 1976:306). The term undivided reflects the wholeness 
(one-ness) element of the whole-parts relation, and in addition to the 
one, it entails the many separated undivided ones (wholes). In other 
words, the one and the many are situated within the context of the 
idea of wholeness and distinctness. 
The employment of the whole-parts relation acquired a closer 
specification in the thought of Boethius, who distinguished between 
homogeneity and heterogeneity – every part of an individual drop of 
water is still water (physical homogeneity), whereas it is not true that 
every part of a horse is a horse (biotic heterogeneity) (see Oeing-
Hanoff, 1976:306). 
Leibniz continued the view of Aristotle by inverting the idea that 
individuality falls under general concepts. Rather, one should say 
that what is universal is contained or embraced in what is particular 
and individual (see Borsche, 1976:310). When he determines the 
individual substance in his Monadology, Leibniz assumes an original 
self-activity prevailing in a state of continuous change (appetition) 
(Borsche, 1976:311). 
In close connection with the early Romantic switch from rationalism 
to irrationalism, Herder affirms that the “deepest foundation of our 
existence is individual” (Herder, 1877: vol. 2, 207). In a letter to La-
vater, Goethe mentions the saying “Individuality is ineffabile” 
(Borsche, 1976:312). According to Fr. Schlegel, individuality is never 
completed, since it is always involved in continuous becoming (“be-
ständiges Werden”). What is essentially incomplete is infinite, and 
therefore individuality is eternity within the human being, and only it 
can be immortal (Borsche, 1976:315). 
Goethe played with the inseparable connection between individuality 
and universality. His answer to the question, what is universal? 
(Was ist das Allgemeine?) is: the individual instance; and his answer 
to the question, what is particular? (Was ist das Besondere?) is: 
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millions of instances (see Von Weiszäcker, 2002:212). Yet this does 
not mean that Goethe actually maintained a balance between uni-
versality and individuality, because according to him, in the words of 
Von Weiszäcker, the Gestalt is not rooted in the law, for the law is 
rooted in the Gestalt (Von Weiszäcker, 2002:209). 
4. Systematic considerations 
It is striking that the battlefield between universality and individuality 
is served by our basic intuitions of number and space. The idea of 
being distinct (at least partially) pre-supposes the discrete meaning 
of number, while understanding universality pre-supposes the spa-
tial awareness of everywhere. Of course the numerical point of entry 
– or mode of explanation – can be complemented in yet another way 
by the spatial angle of approach, namely when its articulation at 
once also highlights numerical analogies within space.9 This hap-
pened during the later Middle Ages, in which we noted that the term 
undivided reflects the one-ness element of what we now identify as 
the spatial whole-parts relation. 
4.1 Knowledge based upon universality 
Although the nature of individuality surely exceeds the limits of the 
numerical (and all other) aspect(s) of reality, it is undoubtedly also 
the case that in our employment of the idea of individuality, our 
arithmetical intuition is prominent. What is perhaps even more im-
portant is that, because concepts are formed on the basis of what is 
universal (universal properties), conceptual knowledge of what is 
individual is impossible. Even Scholasticism was faithful to the 
conviction that whatever is individual is inexpressible (omne indivi-
duum est ineffabile). However, this limitation of conceptual know-
ledge led to a reductionist view of knowledge, one in which know-
ledge is identified with conceptual knowledge. Nontheless, we do 
have knowledge of things in their individuality; the only requirement 
is to realise that this kind of knowledge transcends the scope of 
knowledge mediated by universality, i.e. conceptual knowledge. The 
                                      
9 Within the philosophy of Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven, the coherence between 
the multiple irreducible aspects of reality is accounted for by referring to these 
interconnections as modal analogies (retrocipations and anticipations). In this 
context, the original numerical meaning of succession (one, another one and so 
on without end, endlessly) is turned “inwards” by the spatial meaning of 
continuity – seen in the endless divisibility of a continuous whole. 
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identification of knowledge with conceptual knowledge may be 
designated as rationalistic. 
The kind of knowledge involved in approximating what is unique, 
contingent and individual transcends the limits of universality (con-
cepts) and should therefore be acknowledged for what it is: concept-
transcending knowledge. Nicolai Hartmann once explained the 
Kantian notion of a Grenzbegriff in a striking way. He says that the 
notion of an unknowable “thing-in-itself” (Ding an sich) still requires 
a thought-form, through which it is thought of as unknowable – this 
is what a Grenzbegriff intends to capture.10 Without buying into the 
role of the so-called “thing-in-itself” in the philosophy of Kant (cf. the 
critical remarks made in Strauss, 1982:133, 141-143), it is important 
to leave room for a “form-of-thinking” that accounts for knowledge 
transcending the limits of concept-formation. 
In his work on logic and epistemology, De Vleeschauwer (1952:213) 
explicitly mentions what he calls the “individual delimitation”. He 
writes that the domain of the “individual” is one where our intellectual 
capacities must fail. His own nominalistic affinities are evident in his 
view that there are only individual things and processes. He holds 
that, in spite of all similarities between entities and processes, there 
will always be an irreducible kernel of individuality, which causes 
one thing to be different from another. Science, with its directedness 
towards the universal has serious difficulties with its inclination to 
know what is individual – because “knowledge of what is individual 
is simply impossible” – something about which philosophy, accor-
ding to De Vleeschauwer (1952:213), had clarity since its inception. 
In other words, De Vleeschauwer adheres to both the nominalistic 
denial of universality outside the human mind and the rationalistic 
identification of knowledge with conceptual knowledge. 
4.2 Knowledge exceeding universality 
From what has been argued thus far, it is clear that the relation 
between law and individuality at least in one sense runs parallel to 
the distinction between universality and individuality. Whereas we 
have pointed out that the notion of universality cannot conceal that it 
is derived from the meaning of the spatial aspect – the awareness of 
                                      
10 Cf. Hartmann (1957:311): “Denn bei Kant ist es nicht so, dass etwa das Ding an 
sich bloss Idee wäre; umgekehrt, da wir das Ding an sich nicht erkennen ..., 
wohl aber denken können, so muss es eine Denkform, eine Art des Begriffs 
geben in der es – eben als unerkennbares – gedacht wird. Das ist die ‘Idee’.” 
10   Koers 72(1) 2007:1-25 
D.F.M. Strauss 
everywhere – the situation with knowledge of what is individual is 
more complicated. 
We have already suggested that a knowledge of what is individual 
exceeds the confines of conceptual knowledge. Yet we can specify 
what is at stake in more precise terms. Consider for a moment how 
we can apply our basic intuition of number, space, movement and 
energy operation in the following case. Think of the quantitative 
properties of a cultural entity (like a chair), of its size and shape 
(spatial), of its relative speed (motion) and of its typical physical 
characteristics (its strength). In every instance, the terms we have 
employed inevitably have a universal scope. This means that, 
whenever any person looks at a chair through the gateway of these 
different (ontic) points of entry,11 the terms generated are used in a 
conceptual way. As long as we restrict the use of such terms to the 
respective ontic domains (modes of explanation), this conceptual 
focus will always be present. This is actually the case with all our 
entitary-oriented everyday concepts (just think of our concepts of 
entities such as planets, houses, chairs and human beings). If we 
designate the terms employed to describe the way in which entities 
function within various aspects of reality as modal terms (see 
Strauss, 2000:26-28, 32-36), then a distinction ought to be drawn. 
When modal terms are used to refer to entities that function within 
the confines of particular modes of being, they are employed in a 
conceptual manner. However, whenever a modal term is put in 
service of referring to whatever exceeds the limits or boundaries of 
such an ontic domain, then we encounter a concept-transcending 
use of such a term – also designated as an idea-use of such terms. 
For example, while merely exploring our quantitative intuition, one 
can speak of a chair in its totality, including all its properties. 
Linguistically, this is expressed by referring to its individuality, its 
uniqueness, its being distinct. The original quantitative meaning of 
number (discrete quantity) – captured as a “primitive term” in axio-
matic set theory12 – is evident in these affirmations, and yet they are 
intended to refer to much more than the mere arithmetical aspect of 
the chair. They therefore indeed constitute idea-usages of modal 
numerical terms. 
                                      
11 Which are then at once elevated to serve as epistemic modes of explanation. 
12 Given in the plural of “elements of” or, in the case of Zermelo Fraenkel’s set 
theory, “members of”. 
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Similarly, instead of speaking of the sizes and dimensions of a chair, 
one may use our intuition of the original meaning of spatial exten-
sion to speak of all facets of the chair – in which case one may refer 
to the chair in its totality. Once again, it is clear that the term totality 
– in spite of its spatial descent (see footnote 9) – refers to much 
more than merely the spatial aspect of the chair. It constitutes there-
fore – in terms of the distinction suggested concerning the two-fold 
usage of modal terms – another example of an idea-use of such 
terms, in this case spatial ones. 
Modern phoronomy (the pure science of movement) understands 
motion in its original sense as uniform flow, without the need of any 
causes (as Aristotle believed). This kinematic intuition of constancy, 
when used in an idea-context, provides us with the idea-knowledge 
of the identity of an entity – its relative constancy amidst all changes 
– where the latter term finds its seat in the physical aspect of energy 
operation. The operation of energy always causes certain effects, 
and in this sense never leaves anything the same, i.e. identical. 
Therefore, the word change can also be employed in an idea-
context. But because the idea-meaning of constancy (consonant 
with the idea of identity) and the idea-use of the term change stem 
from two irreducible modes (detecting changes always presupposes 
constancy), it is not contradictory to use both ideas concurrently. 
By expanding our view, we can indeed highlight the four most basic 
idea-statements that philosophy can formulate about the universe – 
and once again we have to realise that these statements do not 
contradict each other, but rather entail and complement each other:  
• everything is unique;  
• everything coheres with everything else;  
• everything remains identical to itself; and  
• everything changes.  
Only if these statements did not rest upon irreducible modal points 
of entry, would they have been contradictory. 
At this point we may unite the main contours of our historical 
overview by pointing out that most of the issues mentioned converge 
towards an understanding of the role of the four aspects underlying 
the last-mentioned four idea-statements about reality. In fact, we 
have seen that these aspects served as points of entry in the history 
of reflection on law and individuality. Ultimately no view on law and 
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individuality can side-step the first four modes of explanation of the 
world – for in both instances, one encounters a mixture of concep-
tual terms and a concept-transcending usage of modal terms. In 
order to articulate this claim, we now focus on the nature of natural 
laws. 
4.3 The concept of a normative principle and a natural law  
Cassirer mentions another element in the ancient Greek under-
standing of law – namely that nomos constitutes a principle of 
ordering, through which motion and the diversity within reality is 
arranged (Cassirer, 1911:375). During the early modern period, a 
reaction to the traditional Aristotelian-Thomistic view led to a natural 
scientific orientation that treated law within a predominantly rela-
tional coherence.  
This new accent is an effect of a fundamental switch, one in which 
the focus is no longer on the substance of things (their essence), but 
merely on the way in which we experience them. Galileo is therefore 
no longer interested in the essence of things, but instead asks how 
they appear to us. What is revolutionary in his view, according to 
Herold, is that in the absence of thinking about essences (that pro-
ceeded from configurations of motion with distinct degrees of 
perfection) everything in principle is equal in the face of the law – 
amply demonstrated in his remark that he did not study the pedigree 
of geometrical figures (see Herold, 1974:502). 
Up to this point, the following features of natural laws surfaced: that 
they are necessary,13 they constitute an ordering in the sense of a 
relational coherence regulating motion and diversity within reality, 
and they are concerned with the how and not the concrete what of 
things. 
During the early Modern era, these ideas developed within the 
context of the dominance of the modern ideal to understand the uni-
verse in terms of the (mathematical) natural sciences (also known 
as the natural science ideal). In the thought of Hobbes, science, un-
derstood as (natural) philosophy, opened the way to view individual 
things in relation to what is universal. His emphasis on the truth 
entailed in universal propositions (see Herold, 1974:503) reveals his 
nominalistic affinity that projected a human element into the univer-
                                      
13 Stegmüller considers it “Hume’s great achievement to have banished the 
concept of necessity from the concept of cause” (Stegmüller, 1977:36). 
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sality of a natural law. Particularly Newton (1955:1, 15) started to 
explore more extensively the view that a law must be understood as 
a mathematically conceivable rule. While taking distance from the 
idea of a god-given law, the French Enlightenment, and particularly 
D’Alembert, derived from the relations between bodies governed by 
law the validity of the latter (Herold, 1974:505). 
In the thought of Kant, the feature of necessity (Notwendigkeit) is 
accompanied by what he claims to be the universal-validity of a law. 
Insofar as rules are objective, they are designated as laws. We have 
seen that Kant derived these laws in an a priori way from human 
understanding that furnishes phenomena with the law to which they 
are subjected, i.e. understanding creates their lawfulness or law-
conformity (Gesetzmäßigkeit) (see also Kant, 1781: A, 126). Kant’s 
aim is to render comprehensible the “objective validity of the pure 
concepts a priori” of the categories of understanding (Kant, 1781: 
A, 128). 
Hegel explores a further dimension in his science of logic, when he 
focuses on determining law (Gesetz) as what remains the same in 
what changes (Hegel, 1957:122). Cassirer assumes “ultimate logical 
invariants” that are not affected by their changing material content. 
He speaks of “identity and permanence” that lie “at the basis of 
scientific laws” (Cassirer, 1953:325). He actually came quite close to 
an understanding of the conditioning role of the first four modal 
aspects of reality in connection with an articulation of the nature of 
natural laws: 
There is no objectivity outside of the frame of number and mag-
nitude, permanence and change, causality and interaction: all 
these determinations are only the ultimate invariants of expe-
rience itself, and thus of all reality, that can be established in it 
and by it (Cassirer, 1953:309). 
The “ultimate invariants of experience itself” are actually referring to 
the conditioning role of the most basic modal aspects of reality – 
they are indeed those “determinations” co-responsible for the way in 
which we experience reality. 
Without acknowledging the ontic structural configuration of reality, 
and in particular the ontic order of successive modal functions, we 
are left afloat without an anchoring guideline in our attempts to de-
fine the nature of natural laws. But once the underlying and con-
ditioning role of these (ontic) modes of reality is acknowledged, 
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another challenge faces theoretical analysis, namely to distinguish 
between elementary and compound basic concepts.  
• Every scholarly discipline that finds its field of investigation 
delimited by a specific aspect of reality, employs basic concepts 
reflecting the interconnections between its delimiting aspect and 
other aspects of reality. In the case of physics, for example, its 
elementary basic concepts articulate the analogies of pre-
physical aspects within the structure of the physical aspect, found 
in phrases such as physical mass (numerical analogy), physical 
field (spatial), and energy-constancy (the kinematical). 
• On the basis of elementary (analogical) basic concepts, suc-
cessively open for theoretical inspection and analysis, the com-
pound (or complex) basic concepts of a scientific discipline are 
formed by simultaneously involving distinct analogical basic 
concepts. 
Without exploring the methodology of compound basic concepts in 
any detail, we may briefly state the result of such an analysis with 
respect to the nature of norming laws, i.e. of the normative principles 
guiding human action, such as logical principles, historical princi-
ples, social principles, aesthetic principles, jural principles, and so 
on. Mainly in order to side-step the inherent problems of traditional 
views of “natural law” (as a universally-valid system of law founded 
in human reason and holding wherever for all times per se) an 
account of the nature of a principle ought to distinguish between a 
principle given as mere starting-point for human action and the 
diverse, historically changing ways in which such a point of depar-
ture could be given a positive shape in specific unique circum-
stances. 
Yet natural law did see something of the underlying (universal, con-
stant) structure of our legal experience, but it distorted its meaning 
by assuming that those underlying principles are already (for all 
times and all places) made valid (enforced). No principle in this 
fundamental ontic sense is valid per se. Every principle requires 
human intervention in order to be made valid, i.e. no (pre-positive) 
ontic principle holds by and of itself. Only human beings are capable 
of “enforcing” them (as Derrida correctly emphasises),14 and only 
                                      
14 Derrida says (2002:232) that there “are a certain number of idiomatic expres-
sions” in the English language that “have no strict equivalent in French,” such as 
the phrase “to enforce the law,” or “the enforceability of the law”. 
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human beings can give a positive form or shape to them. The ac-
tivity of giving form to underlying principles is sometimes designated 
as acts of positivising, and the result of such acts are accordingly 
also known as positivisations. Habermas frequently speaks of 
“positivising law” (“die Positivierung des Rechts”) (see Habermas, 
1996:71; 1998:101, 173, 180). It is this intermediate and dependent 
position of all positivisations that is reified by the idea of the (logical, 
lingual or social) construction of the world.  
The most basic way to characterise the pre-positive nature of a 
principle is therefore given in the exploration of the point of entry of 
the first three modal aspects of reality, namely when we say that a 
principle is a universal and constant point of departure for human 
action.15 Once this has been said, one can proceed by saying that 
such a principle can only be made valid (enforced) through human 
intervention, i.e. through the action of a competent organ with an 
accountable free will enabling a proper interpretation of the unique 
circumstances in which the principle should be given a concrete 
shape (positivised).16
The account of a pre-positive principle overlaps with the constitutive 
elements that ought to be incorporated in an account of natural 
(physical) laws. Van Fraassen refers to Pierce, who argues that if 
the “uniformity” intended by Mill merely meant regularity without any 
real connection implied between events, then his argument will be 
destroyed (Van Fraassen, 1991:22). The phrase used by Van 
Fraassen in this context, however, states that a law cannot be “the 
mere uniformity or regularity itself”, for a “law must be conceived as 
the reason which accounts for the uniformity in nature” (Van 
Fraassen, 1991:22). The use of the word reason may be interpreted 
to suggest that laws result from the intellectual human endeavors. 
Nonetheless, he continues by claiming that a “law must be con-
ceived as something real, some element or aspect of reality quite 
independent of our thinking or theorising – not merely a principle in 
our preferred science or humanly imposed taxonomy” (Van 
                                      
15 The term universal, as we have argued, derives from the spatial awareness of 
everywhere, the term constant from the core kinematic meaning of uniform flow 
and the phrase point of departure underscores the unity and distinctness of 
each principle. 
16 Once again the key terms employed in this formulation are derived from diverse 
modal aspects: organ from the biotic; will (desire) from the sensitive; 
accountable from the logical-analytical, giving shape (positive form) from the 
cultural-historical, and interpretation from the lingual modality. 
16   Koers 72(1) 2007:1-25 
D.F.M. Strauss 
Fraassen, 1991:22-23). Within the above-mentioned context, this 
implies that the word reason rather means “cause” – in the sense 
that a law is the (extra-mental) cause that accounts for the uniformity 
or regularity of nature. Of course a much easier account would be to 
state that the regularity of nature concerns its orderliness or law-
conformity, entailing that, whatever behaves in law-conformative 
ways, is subject to a law as order for. For this reason, perhaps the 
best translation of the German term Gesetzmässigkeit (Dutch and 
Afrikaans: wetmatig) is subject to law (as done in the translation of 
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus (see footnote 5). 
When Van Fraassen discusses the views of Davidson, he points out 
that, although Davidson does not attempt to define laws, it is 
nonetheless said “that laws are general statements which are con-
firmed by their instances” (Van Fraassen, 1991:33). In this case, the 
distinction between ontic laws and human statements intended to 
capture conceptually what such laws are all about, collapses. The 
acceptance of ontic laws does need “markers”, i.e. terms helping us 
to articulate their ontic nature. The mere fact that we speak in the 
plural about such laws already reflects the constitutive role of the 
meaning of number (the one and the many) in our understanding of 
ontic laws. Furthermore, without the conditioning role of the spatial 
aspect, it cannot be asserted that laws hold everywhere, i.e. that 
they apply universally. Although Van Fraassen (1991:26) does ac-
knowledge universality as a “mark of lawhood”, he does mention, 
with reference to Armstrong and Lewis, that the “criterion of uni-
versality” is “no longer paramount” in a “discussion of laws” (Van 
Fraassen, 1991:28).17
Of fundamental importance is the distinction between modal laws 
and type-laws, for it entails an account of the difference between 
unspecified and specified universality. A modal physical law holds 
for all kinds of physical entities without any specification, whereas a 
physical type-law only holds for a limited class of entities, namely 
those belonging to that type. Such a type-law, for example the law 
for being an atom, holds universally in the sense that it applies to all 
atoms, but this universality is specified, since it only holds for atoms 
(and not for every kind of physical entity). 
                                      
17 This may be the effect of not distinguishing between modal laws (with an 
unspecified universality) and type-laws (with a specified universality). 
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In the case of modal laws and type-laws, the reverse side of 
universality is found in the distinctness of different laws, specified by 
using the idea of delimitation derived from the primitive meaning of 
space. Every law has its own domain of application, a specific and 
distinct sphere within which it obtains. But only when these two 
elements are combined with the constancy (or uniformity) of a law 
and its effect (its force, its validity), is it possible to account for the 
constitutive elements of the compound basic concept of a natural 
(physical) law. 
When Stegmüller discusses the law of causality, he introduces 
multiple terms closely related to the conditioning role of the first four 
modal aspects, and in fact approximates closely our idea of 
compound basic concepts. 
Still others might be added to the features we have already 
mentioned. But since with these the concept of a causal law 
has already reached such a high level of complexity, let us 
confine ourselves to them. For faced with the question ‘what are 
causal laws?’ we must, in accordance with them, give the follo-
wing answer: causal laws are quantitative, deterministic, nearby 
action, succession micro-laws formulated by means of contin-
uous mathematical functions in relation to a homogeneous, 
isotropic spatio-temporal continuum governed by certain 
principles of conservation (Stegmüller, 1977:36). 
Dooyeweerd did not apply his own transcendental-empirical analysis 
to the idea of law in general, for he frequently simply (intuitively) 
states that a law determines and delimits whatever is subjected to it 
(see Dooyeweerd, 1997:1, 508). 
If the distinct scope of laws delimit their unique areas of validity, then 
it is recommendable not to allow the concept of a natural law to 
degenerate into an amorphous collection of predicates, such as 
reflected in a recent factual statement by Stafleu. He says that a law 
is sometimes hidden behind the name axiom, constant, proposition, 
rule, relation, thesis, symmetry, theorem, design, pattern, connec-
tion, prohibition, comparison, phenomenon or prescription (Stafleu, 
2002:39). This list contains elements referring to the law side, the 
factual side, as well as a mixture of ontic phenomena and the 
product of human activity. For example, for the sake of convenience, 
Stafleu calls a mathematical law-conformity (“wiskundige wetmatig-
heid”) such as the theorem of Pythagoras a natural law (Stafleu, 
2002:39). 
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Inherent to a natural law is its meaning as an order for – and this 
mode of speech makes an appeal to the unity in the multiplicity of 
different laws, for without such a unity, laws will clash and not be 
able to constitute an order of laws (a law-order). The constitutive 
role of the numerical mode is evident in this concept of order. 
Furthermore, a law entails its correlate, namely that which is 
factually subjected to it – and this insight points at the inherent 
universal scope of a law – derived from the spatial awareness of 
everywhere (at all places). Without the spatial (dimensional) 
distinction between above and below, the assumed correlation of 
law and subject does not make any sense. That the validity of a 
natural law is not something incidental, is captured by saying that it 
holds constantly – demonstrating the constitutive role of the 
kinematic mode. The notion of validity (being in force) derives from 
the core meaning of the physical aspect, and it has to be incor-
porated in the concept of a physical (natural) law, because 
otherwise the ability to say that a law determines what is subjected 
to it would collapse. 
The compound or complex basic concept of a natural law may 
therefore be formulated as follows; 
As a unique, distinct, and universally valid order for what is 
factually correlated with and subjected to it, a natural law con-
stantly holds (either in an unspecified way as in the case of 
modal laws or in a specified way as in the case of type laws) 
within its domain of validity. 
However, what is particularly striking in reflections on the relation 
between law and factuality, is the widely occurring confusion of law 
and law-conformity. 
5. Law and subject – a new light on the relation 
between Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven 
Since the Renaissance the all-pervasive influence of nominalism 
severely derailed our understanding of the relationship between 
universality and individuality. One angle of approach has been 
explored above, namely by drawing a clear distinction between con-
ceptual knowledge and concept-transcending (idea-)knowledge. To 
my mind this approach is in line with most of the classical analyses 
and expositions of the controversy between realism and nominalism, 
where the difference between universality and individuality (the 
general and the particular) is employed as the crucial distinction. 
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When the nature of law and subject is considered in terms of the 
relationship between universality and individuality what is most 
striking is found in connection with the difference between the 
universality of a law and the way in which the determining role of 
such a law is reflected by what is factually subjected to it. 
Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd both articulated their general idea of 
God’s law in a fairly straight-forward way, without realising that they 
actually employed modal terms in a concept-transcending 
manner.18 Vollenhoven, for example, holds that God is sovereign 
and that God’s law is valid for creatures (Vollenhoven, 1967:12, 14; 
2005:14, 16).19 Vollenhoven uses the word bewerking (cultivation) 
in the context of (although in a broader sense than) the historical 
subject-object relation (Vollenhoven, 1967:135; 2005:139). 
However, the core meaning of the cultural-historical mode is indeed 
given in control or formative power. And “having power” is equivalent 
to the notion of sovereignty. Therefore the affirmation of God’s 
sovereignty merely employs a modal historical term in a concept-
transcending way.20
Likewise the idea of the validity of God’s law (its being in force) 
derives from a concept-transcending use of the meaning of the 
physical aspect. Vollenhoven experienced severe difficulties in his 
use of the term boundary in connection with the status and position 
of God’s law. This is clearly seen from the fact that he felt the 
necessity to qualify his use of the spatial term boundary in such a 
way that when it is used for God’s law, one should not think of 
spatiality: “With ‘boundary’ one does not think of spatiality: for 
spatiality itself belongs to what has been created.” Nonetheless 
connecting the idea of law to the idea of a boundary inevitably 
results in an idea-use of our spatial intuition. It is simply impossible 
to escape from a concept-transcending use of spatial terms in the 
attempt to distinguish between God and creation. This is particularly 
clear when Vollenhoven holds that law always stands above that for 
which it is valid (see Vollenhoven, 1967:14). In order to be 
                                      
18 In general they did not come to terms with the fact that modal terms allow for 
both a conceptual and a concept-transcending use. 
19 The sections quoted from Vollenhoven (1967) are identical to the corresponding 
sections in Vollenhoven (2005) – explaining why the 2005 page references are 
added to the 1967 references. 
20 The Bible uses many other “modal terms” in its revelation of God – such as that 
God is life, God is love, God is just, and so on. Why single out just one of them? 
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consistent Vollenhoven also had to disqualify the term above – it is 
not supposed to refer to something spatial because the aspect of 
space belongs to what has been created. Yet, saying that God’s law 
is elevated above creation begs the question, for the negation of 
spatiality is actually accomplished through an idea-use of the spatial 
term above! This demonstrates that the negation of spatiality is 
achieved by employing the meaning of space!21
Once a distinction is drawn between conceptual knowledge and 
concept-transcending knowledge, it is possible to note a strong 
convergence in the views of Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd regar-
ding the place of God’s law. When Vollenhoven highlights validity as 
the distinctive property of God’s law, his stance is not far from 
Dooyeweerd’s position, for the latter constantly speaks of the univer-
sal validity of God’s law.22
We can proceed by mentioning that the two philosophers are quite 
close in their concept-transcending modes of speech in respect of 
idea-usages of physical terms such as encountered in their belief 
that God’s law has an effect on what is subjected to it – God’s law is 
valid, it holds in the sense of determining creatures (Dooyeweerd: 
bepaal; Vollenhoven: bepaaldheid – determine and determination). 
But since I have discussed these issues extensively in a different 
context (see Strauss, 2006),23 we may terminate our discussion with 
a concluding remark. 
                                      
21 When Van der Walt explains his Biblically shaped ontology, the same vicious 
circle surfaces. His claim is that one cannot speak of God in spatial terms. Why 
not? Because “God is elevated above space” (Van der Walt, 1976:128). Once 
again the phrase “elevated above” reveals its modal seat within the spatial 
aspect, and this implies that only through the employment of spatial terms is it 
possible to claim that God transcends (!) space. 
22 The same applies to the two options apparently dividing the views of 
Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd regarding the terms above and side, because in 
both cases we simply meet spatial terms employed in concept-transcending 
ways. 
23 An important difference between Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd is given in their 
respective acceptance and denial of universality at the factual side of reality. 
Dooyeweerd identifies law and law-conformity (wet and wetmatig) and in doing 
so strips factual reality of its universality (a nominalistic after-effect in his 
thought). Vollenhoven explicitly rejects the identification of law and law-con-
formity (see Vollenhoven, 2005:16). Dooyeweerd (and Stafleu) speak of the 
individual factual side of reality (Stafleu, 1968:304; see Stafleu, 1989:25, 26, 44, 
83; 2002:16) that is correlated with law and law-conformity. They are both 
confused about the relationship between law and law-conformity. 
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6. Concluding remark 
The history of reflection on the relationship between law and 
individuality helped us to articulate a systematic view on the nature 
of normative laws (principles) and natural laws – acknowledging that 
a sound analysis has to understand what elementary (analogical) 
and compound basic concepts are about. The close connection 
between universality and individuality indeed paved the way for an 
understanding of the destructive role of nominalism in modern philo-
sophy and the denial of universality outside the “human mind” – 
eventually leading to the Kantian view of human understanding as 
the formal law-giver of nature. The mirror-side of this rationalistic 
element of modern nominalism is manifest in the rise of historicism 
and the eventual linguistic turn – exploring the irrationalistic part of 
nominalism. Discerning these issues did benefit from the distinction 
between conceptual knowledge and concept-transcending know-
ledge – a distinction that was finally made fruitful for a brief assess-
ment of some differences and similarities in the thought of Dooye-
weerd and Vollenhoven. 
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